Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24434621368ad2f6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.1 KB Created: 2021-09-06 01:47:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: d2126cc998bccecdffc2376d2ab11d42 SHA-1: 89be6bc410cbf9b7a87d4ecf2943808d7cdf9699 SHA-256: 24434621368ad2f61eb318bb40350d8d5292e524bd751d5250e5eae0586f563b
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1566.002 Spearphishing Link

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, specifically targeting users with a fake MFA or one-time code request. The document contains numerous links to external websites, many hosted on compromised WordPress sites or disposable domains, suggesting an attempt to direct users to malicious landing pages. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of PDF-specific heuristics and the overall structure indicate a malicious intent to harvest credentials or exploit user trust.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9938

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://chcial.ru/uplcv?utm_term=apple+developer+enterprise+program+license+agreement+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://rzn-house.ru/upload/file/36004648315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.xpresswedding.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b77657308bf---21919685974.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fxmeat.com/upload/file/534f6c6c8ca1be6560ce1c019f303837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://accounting789.com/ThImg/file/665982064.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://neuragen.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c92a0470c72---zesus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--80aaa1arbfjoe3bzh.xn--p1ai/data/files/41902013030.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://englewoodgrassfarm.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d3fe06feb7bbbee64feebcc90d9ff3b6/55038271409.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://atlantichomeportugal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c867dd20093---vafofixumog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.themeshcowork.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dcf7a3675015164ec14029ab979d9eac/36112825367.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://weinquartier.at/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b7e4c7b1b9ec3475b13a49f5b0e5aaf7/82079428508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bmsorganica.com/userfiles/file/dimalolida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vnnc.vn/img-hdmedia/files/30286663241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quaretti.it/userfiles/files/pifomiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lang-mayer.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16099b0019f864---71738757948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.victorian-manor.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160760351cd7dd---30993316865.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panegovernance.com/ourprojects/chowki/UserFiles/file/54498448017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://naoshima-habitant.com/images/blog/file/4867491143.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.jahnigterbraak.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d5ff048c6e8---62716429723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.verpoort-bouw.be/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae9230269c3---kekaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://spencershaulageltd.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9705e1e31af0a95fa3927d7942a51215/wabejabemanosak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.pharmaright.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l21lpqah2scm9au5epnjdepbpj/wujubejojosupiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cometsecurity.in/admin/userfiles/file/89081804587.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kamber.dk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ef2a1c7c4f5c6b8650aafd08a87e7910/nuladobekuzegusevetofive.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://108pizza.pl/uploads/userfiles/files/zuxuvaridusikedovuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://moscreen.in/cmsfiles/file/zavuwu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000de05.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE05 11008 bytes
SHA-256: 0cf4dfbcce19795dddb48270840afccf5022931c822ba25b2a7515fa8f90a491
font_01_sfnt_off0000f76a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF76A 17204 bytes
SHA-256: 75102aca03995bd11b606d9df6eaa68d58a74d055657f5782cd824b48c9c4bbf
font_02_sfnt_off00012416.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12416 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_03_sfnt_off00013c23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13C23 2064 bytes
SHA-256: 5221cc56e96b657ff7c15f49bf1fbf1b5222e15cd7ffd769ce953162a3e53832

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