Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 243f51bb394bd447…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.0 KB Created: 2020-12-23 07:41:13 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0fba7b200da3a0c7436b49f3b29c7650 SHA-1: 151e8410838a5fdc1e427ae06cef3b8976b9d9b3 SHA-256: 243f51bb394bd44715f85a3dd09953cf20afe092460b9b27c8de48a26a46c02d
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including ML classification and ClamAV detection. It contains social engineering lures consistent with ClickFix attacks, instructing the user to copy and paste commands into execution contexts like the Run dialog or a terminal. The embedded URL `https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=itunes+mobile+device+helper+windows+10` suggests a phishing or malware distribution attempt, likely to download and execute a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9994

Heuristics 7

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • ClickFix social engineering attack high SE_CLICKFIX
    Document instructs the user to press Win+R or paste a command into a terminal — consistent with ClickFix attacks that bypass macro restrictions by tricking users into running malicious commands directly
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/strik?utm_term=itunes+mobile+device+helper+windows+10
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374685/normal_5f93940d9bfc6.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369327/normal_5fa5dcc7dff95.pdf
    • https://serorufadorulu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483245/tadenudukikavo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.opentle.org
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/879c265e-db0b-4308-ae29-81d17978111f/midobol.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/nowonovege/best_movies_on_netflix_2020_kids.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6bee8e4a-e4e4-4d2e-8068-308a06c225d0/snow_emergency_levels_lucas_county.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/taturi/3161006663.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68aaccf8-9167-462d-807c-0a3286652924/total_drama_island_porn_game.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xamibudasagas/zumababubosa.pdf
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc1116c11f6a41984869c2f/t/5fc187e73485235c8600d909/1606518760422/shriners_gun_show_jackson_ms.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lokijuronig/xuvibefibusakewaxadel.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c69e.bin
23b5b1b679e74f7dadf732e2dc05eff208901744a39fec1a5cc210e509d9471a
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC69E 3784 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d41f.bin
d626aa817fd393627a4db89feaa15a1a81a6ca5f9355fbee8f2117b3f8fe8c09
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD41F 5524 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000e6c6.bin
dbfa5413c1a9c227ff4952054b5b0b4ac96982f99bb483e8315c477d4481d2cf
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE6C6 5672 bytes
font_03_sfnt_off0000f4d5.bin
4498a6c65c86353cda2c92bc411be2af323969fd960439db660ba171fa55abd2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF4D5 10640 bytes
font_04_sfnt_off0001196f.bin
9853a4a918762215dfcba51349555ff48d39e56332efe18e2f333ca30d8a5b61
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1196F 16096 bytes