Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 24340ec6d97344ec…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.4 KB First seen: 2022-03-21
MD5: eb2f70ab4786e16304719d660e661acc SHA-1: 5e03059eb57988ccba7e9c59703684112e83de36 SHA-256: 24340ec6d97344ec785f64adff2c14dd20c417aeffaf7e5cbd76ad26d1d2bee2
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability CVE-2017-11882. The presence of ".objupdate" and the decoded object data strongly indicate that this exploit is intended to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening the document. No scripts were extracted, and the document body contained only a numerical string, providing no further context on the payload.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000007f.bin
223e55417cb1315b30bccb3f308b0a1e1ff95369a62492eef3ad36402afa51a1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7F 1445 bytes