Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23e93f4629ce9e8a…

MALICIOUS

RTF

801.1 KB Created: 2018-04-18 01:47:00 First seen: 2018-04-30
MD5: 47453de7bce1a7771933374ece533246 SHA-1: 89bfe6844e11916da5e4b1fa70f9dec7b29a8b6b SHA-256: 23e93f4629ce9e8a50b02bbec695b587ab403745731ea52c8f4e7594288ef78e
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple embedded OLE objects and triggers an OLE activation via \objupdate, which is a strong indicator of exploitation. The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-8759 confirms the exploitation of this specific vulnerability to achieve code execution. The embedded benign URL is not considered a malicious IOC.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 10 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 10

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002c4b.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2C4B 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 27fc393dc810f8bd426a7fe2ef71f72bb0e07ac21ec3acdedd364c4ea884673a
objdata_01_off00015c72.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x15C72 26683 bytes
SHA-256: cac63fa4e3bae7583c97dca570384f4500250129e13e5eb87cac3bcae500bdc1
objdata_02_off00028c99.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x28C99 26683 bytes
SHA-256: dd81e67fa7c63e06f021af2a5b0b598e88b110e196c9091788833a1a70730eee
objdata_03_off0003bcc0.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3BCC0 26683 bytes
SHA-256: a2c31a865b5fa48e76036c226cd389a889c2e5fdf7a4062648a225c477c1d908
objdata_04_off0004ece7.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4ECE7 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 92fc346ed7d38a0fb5ad8e1eafcdd007a47cbc0aedcf0c071f55d71bf4fb8236
objdata_05_off00061d5a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x61D5A 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 31ce71325a40954c5b912eb163eaa664c53802315b08d0f3b94dc6fa668682de
objdata_06_off00074d81.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x74D81 26683 bytes
SHA-256: c7cfd3441bcdf2bc917363c2f097eb02254bfc579702ebaa01d04f6796b76db5
objdata_07_off00087da8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87DA8 26683 bytes
SHA-256: d40ec9a4da49ae7011d34717efe6dc805db78500303d766eb01d000a7f487a0c
objdata_08_off0009adcf.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9ADCF 26683 bytes
SHA-256: 702fcbb47b9c946b564e3bfe5d7a459e2e02d37b164a2a0065c3348308f9eae6
objdata_09_off000addf6.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xADDF6 26683 bytes
SHA-256: db15b8e6bd1fd6b9c44825a1eceecaeb8f28d43574fdf29e5e76fcdb9a5f164c