Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23d5bfbbbf6e198c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.7 KB Created: 2021-09-18 08:04:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: c05daec932805bec8483fc1956ef71be SHA-1: a6c4bd1c28df6f4274a678e47aaf0a84fd38c6a3 SHA-256: 23d5bfbbbf6e198c5192f109c3a30995366df03836957e187894bef5ac1c2513
336 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1539 Steal or Forge Credentials

This PDF document contains embedded JavaScript that attempts to lure the user into executing PowerShell commands, likely to steal O365 credentials. The document also contains lures for MFA harvesting, consistent with credential phishing. The embedded script and numerous external URLs suggest a phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 11

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=o365+powershell+login PDF link annotation
    • https://www.rath-catering.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161338fa8afff7---13013844418.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fjordancv.info/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/711b8a6a9c4bda684248055d709e913b/pebak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nyett.hk/uploads/news/files/25231871863.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shunnasato.com/sazizesusetemot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://accessprecision.com/userfiles/file/66004722310.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://labelmarket.eu/data/file/gifonemixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zvaracskaskola.eu/editor_uploads/system/files/mudatenipo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://italvaping.com/file/13930152919.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rjt1.org/upload/files/xibarusuzenoxige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://luckysurface.itweald.com/uploads/files/613f76f385b77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosaicopeoplecorporation.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gobumisi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://apluskleaning.com/admin/images/file/41617598928.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://quangtriasianwindow.com/uploads/image/files/57048212043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://blv.by/upload/editor/files/44808552072.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vargyasnekonyveles.hu/kepek/other/file/surilesekawawenumatuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ozmutludokum.com/userfiles/file/21958490169.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://asiatravel.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a14d830f2c36f7a801c6dac0490a0e88/fizeri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maintogelonline.bet/contents/files/bikaxewopobujofedebumex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grandioso.asia/editor_upload_image/file/20738259477.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wx-test.com/upload/ckimg/files/202109020254029714.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://eis-pieschel.de/UserFiles/File/bamiwijonulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://processwork.archerhuang.com/ConImg/files/sizigakopokufufig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zoldjogsi.hu/uploads/files/15623742149.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://easy-sleep24.de/shop/images/editorfiles/file/rotobikakafejoxox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biswasi.com/userfiles/files/murekow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.rath-caIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014591.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14591 1620 bytes
SHA-256: c2e17a6b76602a81128ac289b6a7655e1ad0df747a11bbcb88519c6cd2265335
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 9 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='Smallpdf Desktop'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Zoduyose Bifeceti</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>O365 powershell login. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;O365 last logon powershell. O365 user login history powershell. Powershell login to </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>O365 powershell login. &lt;br&gt;&lt;center&gt;&lt;h2&gt;O365 last logon powershell. O365 user login history powershell. Powershell login to </rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>O365 powershell login</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-08T03:08:25'
  xmp:CreatorTool='Smallpdf Desktop'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='a0681bf8-5765-43b0-89c2-5866d4860977'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='86bb0160-95a5-4b06-b7d5-b9c10811deee'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000dbb1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDBB1 18416 bytes
SHA-256: c041626d9c21c2f1aacf9574c65fc06303d06d74c7f8090d2b51dda7bd245fb9
font_01_sfnt_off00010c61.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C61 10856 bytes
SHA-256: cd7e4faa29efd5cd01c6e87968992b09a60477e7e84ae6c11a32970c2f376d3b
font_02_sfnt_off00012579.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12579 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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