Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23c030c5351139da…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.6 KB First seen: 2023-01-18
MD5: 0380aef8e9a4d70d09f734087decfd22 SHA-1: 566ab1e8baa3298a3d95e436792f27e4a1cbe56e SHA-256: 23c030c5351139dae3d5f274bb14986ea1e8111cec4d531755c12e1225e529ea
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, suggesting the embedded object will be automatically executed when the document is opened. The document body's instruction to 'enable editing' further supports a social engineering lure to trigger the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000112.bin
55e0506c8bcb7288629fa5d574f5683c32f6a4104d0312780313f69fbf2eb300
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x112 1633 bytes