MALICIOUS
302
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate
The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA project with a Document_Open macro. This macro utilizes GetObject and CallByName functions, and a critical heuristic indicates it's a VBA property-stored shellcode loader that executes shellcode from document properties. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'Enable editing' and 'Enable content', a common lure for macro-based malware.
Heuristics 9
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VBA property-stored shellcode loader critical OLE_VBA_PROPERTY_SHELLCODE_LOADERVBA auto-exec macro takes the address (VarPtr) of a byte buffer decoded from a document property, marks memory executable (VirtualProtect/VirtualAlloc), and transfers control through a callback API (e.g. SetTimer/EnumWindows). The payload is hidden in the document properties rather than the macro source — the SVCReady loader pattern, a native shellcode runner rather than a parser CVE.
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VBA project part renamed to evade filename detection high OOXML_VBA_PROJECT_RENAMEDThe VBA project is bound through the OOXML relationship/content type but its part is not named vbaProject.bin. Legitimate Office producers always emit vbaProject.bin; renaming it hides the macros from path-only scanners (observed in the SVCReady loader).
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Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPENDocument_Open macro
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GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJGetObject call
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CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAMECallByName call
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VBA reads reversed config from document properties high OLE_VBA_REVERSED_DOCPROP_CONFIGVBA applies StrReverse to values read from the document's custom/built-in properties. Storing reversed configuration (URLs, CLSIDs, env-var names, payload names) in document properties keeps indicators out of the macro source — an obfuscation technique used by the SVCReady loader.
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VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present (project part renamed away from vbaProject.bin: word/bmukuygxxC.bin)
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Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LUREDocument instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.basa79ca7e9acf5cb5281116053fc80680d66e15e5221928290cd495b01354bf63b |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 21263 bytes |
vbaProject_00.binbb56254ccf34353a7f912be7d3adb6a8847a332adc1ddfce76dd345288c11494 |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/bmukuygxxC.bin | 14848 bytes |
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