Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23b55e5506d734bb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

27.9 KB First seen: 2023-01-17
MD5: 498aecd812c01aa84440cd42efd88476 SHA-1: db1fa5ebdf839e01ec53e4da515cb03cfaf5e507 SHA-256: 23b55e5506d734bb2fdd87d98f835bbffb69c0ae26dbbd7894f02aa2dce8f2ce
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The \objupdate directive indicates that the object will be activated upon opening, and the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic suggests the document prompts the user to enable editing. This combination strongly points to an exploit delivery mechanism targeting a known Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000055d7.bin
f2ff2a3af7d5fae312f84ba29f95614f2a68addc8edcd5451be9483d216e0543		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x55D7 1340 bytes

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