Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23b24132eea38eed…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.21 MB
MD5: 2bc6068d660970a51a4a1307c9d6ee56 SHA-1: c06b22d088320cf25f67654f35fddf8f52c33f8e SHA-256: 23b24132eea38eed15a5b0e7fc0614293cd61d910847e0f2e3a552e706139358
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics indicates that the file is designed to exploit this known vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is forced to activate, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001202.bin
a5e5df7a2b24c4daa4bcf8010c55df6e0cd79675ea8b1da7af899d0c2742d854
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202 27187 bytes
objdata_01_off0001ca27.bin
1a9daf7f5259077ae9a7fba5e35fb7f5d70b6d43574b5a4ed8dc4e9c9ad184d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1CA27 475057 bytes