Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 23a500b9c73a6687…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.5 KB
MD5: e31e8a12b6244c6c220535255a89870d SHA-1: b078507b5dd29d777526dc1b5078d2e3621b9bf8 SHA-256: 23a500b9c73a6687db33f5b02d719be61c158d7870b5728b037ab99c74fb6c01
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. Heuristic firings indicate the use of automatically linked OLE objects and ".objupdate" commands, which are commonly used to trigger exploits. This pattern strongly suggests an attempt to leverage the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000a4.bin
5e4428344daaf96961396a441788dc2d88589c07a22d54b69d1387dc1e9a1b9c
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA4 1530 bytes