Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2355325e5e16464b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

82.0 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: c1bdc78e45aba194eb00713998a79b5b SHA-1: 408a50f5dcd3706480d7661a5b6cc76a22ad4977 SHA-256: 2355325e5e16464b77eabd29654bc2313cffa49370a758cda6e56054fb86a3fd
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristic firings indicating the use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess, ShellExecute, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. Additionally, a suspicious invocation of cmd.exe with an execution flag was detected. The OLE slack anomaly suggests potential obfuscation or embedded malicious content. These indicators collectively point to an attempt to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 83,991 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 59,426 bytes (71%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API