RTF malware analysis — malicious · 234f8686301836ee

MALICIOUS

RTF

38.8 KB First seen: 2024-06-06

MD5: e126f9e810d78e576e2f641f3a3b0310 SHA-1: 5d1bf8691a6e117474f14a40fa6d02c15d790798 SHA-256: 234f8686301836ee4b470a1b6b042274fb4c6cf527e078dda84010f51a44113d

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object with embedded Equation Editor data. Heuristics indicate the use of \objdata and \objupdate, strongly suggesting exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with exploit-laced documents.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000712.bin` `a0f7a87995cebe0809899979e3bf97831cd0e967d0edfb51a9ea839e49a8feb6`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x712	2208 bytes

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