RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 2339b86940822c7c

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.7 KB First seen: 2023-01-29

MD5: 02587bf244c85fddd32b4bf0de6df1e8 SHA-1: 40e2f39c68aed88f7f8a191c514e45a3527c0d66 SHA-256: 2339b86940822c7cd64adad4fb27d5f99cc2edb70a0088ce3843939ff70332f5

200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an OLE object that exploits the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution when the OLE object is activated. The presence of the `CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE` heuristic firing strongly indicates this exploit mechanism. The document body is heavily obfuscated and unreadable, providing no further context on the specific lure.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE

RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000f05.bin` `e6111917022cd175e49a27e18166f7b41ae64f2e71d8f5da34914ed247c839ce`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0xF05	4199 bytes

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