Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 230b96381d886c46…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.5 KB Created: 2021-05-06 22:48:24 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 63e06297c0a6464807a5576a3de75909 SHA-1: b625072d11f39f60eaec090e58a4768499d3c047 SHA-256: 230b96381d886c46bb8b955cde8bf75cd2f1f155e8ecb1b5fecbc8e0df535e83
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The presence of a 'download button' lure further supports the attack pattern of tricking users into downloading a malicious file.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://moniimpex.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607cca3cd5b60---11912820129.pdf
    • https://rlvanstory.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59c61d09d8a763e9c7e3ec0409409b49/gadatuwuzumenijopibogawu.pdf
    • https://brunoamaranti.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vtrmj8i2tab8fv7qstqqi1kms3/64724643827.pdf
    • https://agsposure.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/678a0828ba1733182dc090bacbf705b3/xujavavidilazimi.pdf
    • https://www.saenger-ohg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a04d4beb26---49715429493.pdf
    • http://sl-light.ru/design/img/upload/file/91137217036.pdf
    • https://evenimentecastel.ro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/jctj5hdi2gokr9ihqo9fes4hpn/josiwagosonu.pdf
    • https://aronabritcan.com/userfiles/file/libozujojavikinew.pdf
    • http://www.elsecretodelolivo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607339f0720bc---40823960055.pdf
    • https://outsourcedbackoffice.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/950a43b78c718dff15e028a842fc27c0/98111093004.pdf
    • http://angelcabrera.com/FCKfiles/file/9457704326.pdf
    • http://www.sunarpazarlama.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/33f8ddekm9vtl15bpd9bkpae44/48948364910.pdf
    • https://drahmetbostanci.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087720548a00---betezowi.pdf
    • https://adbetelparaguay.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d7486bd4884007fee410068e1ad9798f/zodeparalur.pdf
    • https://spaslask.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6alh4ssaarplnsi7uaq30cr9qa/jubesafujixugonanapo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=action+plan+excel+sheet+template
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f6f9.bin
f4ddfaf8f8786cd48aab6719b86484b27b343854be6773fbdd3e459f744ab2aa		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF6F9 5136 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010851.bin
842a6f422be18f2959a71d2b8d4cdb95c6a981746209918cc0fcd601e0f2018e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10851 10748 bytes

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