Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2308c0e5961c8070…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.3 KB Created: 2020-07-08 23:18:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: be794e7335dd5fe74f39677a89d2b1b4 SHA-1: 6d7883b1500a1158afbcfcd31112686c4a6a039f SHA-256: 2308c0e5961c807047c52ce2178ec7f90fc17df0c648f9257a06feadae456a86
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links designed to appear as a printable ruler, which is a common lure for phishing or malware delivery. The primary link directs to a known malicious redirector, and the document also hosts a link farm with many similarly structured URLs. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=printable%20square%20ruler%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.lindalgraham.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455283/7d86161771d526.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sharonstoyandminiaussies.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856071/tobetobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.anchoredsoulfit.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070911/joxutedes_birikunituw_towufinajok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.romainewashington.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131857193/ropodefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mountpleasantsaundersfoot.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738562/pufumowikigaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.blacktowntrails.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740433/3a2be11163.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.illinoistocht.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437233/3188983.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.koahspearguns.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813849/worabugesezu_fowipe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.5537gallery.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636954/2116971.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.sjuartdesign.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606087/wulixakitanajukaf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://polobepokug.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/64959217650.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ruzugebemem.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/10788592277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jipebowojor.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mivile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pazavapasen.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vuribav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zizixabaga.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bafamurejutitadon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gofusibosaduxigagixuvoma.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/nemevisofopanufu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/21533622499.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000658f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x658F 5072 bytes
SHA-256: 6d9cfe2cdf55fe40e31d1b47d4e2f2ec946649a8cf76cbf70b76f2d867e1664a
font_01_sfnt_off000076c0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76C0 10940 bytes
SHA-256: a18d4d3919856089ffede2e10a7d5e3651fde171168dc9b213aad5c75dd82ff2

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