Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2306f5185b372f77…

MALICIOUS

RTF

734.2 KB Created: 2019-01-07 23:54:00 First seen: 2020-02-04
MD5: 7d2cd4a5e10b4e6a86b53dc7532d88e7 SHA-1: 28de9c9264beeac443facb598f28ad9623494f74 SHA-256: 2306f5185b372f77e78c24037f029a4b14f52a402bb49afc27e1a4afa05c80c9
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object embeddings, with specific rules indicating the presence of package objects and an \objupdate command designed to force OLE activation. This suggests the file is designed to exploit vulnerabilities within OLE object handling to execute arbitrary code. The embedded object file 'objdata_00_off00000b2c.bin' is the primary artifact of interest.

Heuristics 5

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Package object class high RTF_OBJCLASS_PACKAGE
    OLE Package object — can wrap arbitrary files
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 5 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00002540.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2540 70702 bytes
SHA-256: 750c87a33fc649b54ddc878adf27d1c7a7f5c3e9fed251de70cbbc68ef0110b0