Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22f054cc0c46cf29…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.12 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-10-20
MD5: 24714adda084d5f1ca822666f6a4a5a5 SHA-1: 415b047b96cd3597344a9132d9fe4b262dccf115 SHA-256: 22f054cc0c46cf29828c4b06fa6232aa47128f2390900baca250d4b12c3a0eed
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a payload that, when triggered, leads to the execution of a malicious PDF. The PDF itself contains a direct link to a payload, indicating a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is generic.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
0bedd32ea8c7bec8ef74cc8e5bea59e33d01f9a02d0a98c97ddecca9bc6aa980		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1812 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
1d2ec8c34cd896579f65f65c173b57c8802ffeb65e1c8d4d593db4e96358e9b4		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00195DB3/Ole10NatiVe 1876 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00061e00.pdf
c30d63874df0fc780ca304f91d30cee0017ff2339e2021a16df25914f6672273		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x61E00 773632 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
f36ed47479b6bec59e7b1db4f7ba894ecbe9737e2b161fb856253284d862c0af		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1169920 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
f46d41e1044daa20dc00de9fd48cd652ff183f2c83341b8ef720bc766a92931a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1148928 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00016000.pdf
b52e47697bc03ddb410b8e39fb0c413b24265c83aa757ab710a369eff38912b5		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x16000 1084416 bytes

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