Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22ed187928a5a502…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB
MD5: 9bb1b8452d24ab6b16a846647a96ccbe SHA-1: 21485b6608107513b3c242b1ffe1d745e9d672ce SHA-256: 22ed187928a5a50221a4b01bebbb8a83a47ab0372dd52b83ee315dd1c3eee814
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PDF document that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader related to XFA forms. This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code. The ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93' further confirms its malicious nature. No scripts were extracted, but the exploit itself is the primary attack vector.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-93
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
d38a96570d5f0fbd4622d592648df56bc004e2d0116359b9ce7b6383cafab118
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 83391 bytes