Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22bf62800298f061…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.8 KB Created: 2020-11-20 05:02:31 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-26
MD5: 17ce82e9d63259863b77d1f1328588ac SHA-1: 18ea046c6668f65efc9fdd3c3ea7b0e106d8640b SHA-256: 22bf62800298f061d489768ca82402094b2a27172766bc4e2a17235585ef8a42
370 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious activity, including links to known malicious redirectors and a large number of external PDF links, suggesting a link farm for SEO poisoning or phishing. The document also contains lures related to payment redirection and brand impersonation (Facebook), aiming to trick users into clicking on malicious URLs. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature, indicating it likely serves as a dropper or phishing page.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://sazalilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592982/1203016.pdf.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?utm_term=verizon+jetpack+unlimited+data In PDF document text
    • https://sazalilo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592982/1203016.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nimijakis.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134577625/fijevapekip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4390071/normal_5f9c2ae38e95f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380411/normal_5fac00de1803c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizifafub.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134714450/xolinaw_robovuz_kuvotev_tedada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375509/normal_5f90f041ab316.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zemigiduwagafu/symbols_of_judaism_christianity_and_islam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/8b368e1a-e166-4ae0-bc79-5a3f75aa9e93/vapekivujozosupofinimagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/numegubowalonan/creep_craft_2_full_version.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/495d1089-e105-422c-ac98-e82c9e965072/the_physics_of_wall_street.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e8bd4fe1-7fd8-4ebd-ad12-71f97d8bb342/rendimiento_de_materiales_de_constru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7dab0374-6a27-437c-bed1-2198152671a2/zejefijexoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010313.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10313 5196 bytes
SHA-256: 742d4e852f6a46f6a9f5f91d7be2c367032f204b58860f6431488723871e1421
font_01_sfnt_off000114bb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x114BB 11096 bytes
SHA-256: 6e8f71111ec2ee90a559fa74a718ba9f38022de1c29f42760ccfc8910e62a408

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.