Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22ade5dbd3fb6a4d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

92.0 KB Created: 2020-12-11 09:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: af4aae598fca3fb06d8fc8a71e52b949 SHA-1: 984376a9eda44cdd26014e69870aef6c3d54606f SHA-256: 22ade5dbd3fb6a4d10a8b2f177e85d86672dbd3c8c2863815d8f774388750362
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1140 Deobfuscate or Decode Files or Information

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of 'CreateObject' and the ClamAV detection as 'Doc.Dropper.Generic' strongly suggest that the macro is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. While no specific URLs were identified as malicious in the provided list, the embedded VBA artifacts are the primary indicators of malicious activity.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Generic-9823794-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Generic-9823794-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2d80a9c9e1067b5fd5907bf594959bf7962da09d2e6cf6dbaaef865de786b983		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 9336 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
b5df8ebf77d78f10b041796c3110670147ab9096a9f20c711bd559104244abf6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36864 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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