Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22aaa3e882155a64…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

43.0 KB First seen: 2023-07-20
MD5: 25da98d04b93a60606dc3cf726cbc28c SHA-1: 77465442dde8d5bce140728ffdf6bc0dfa03290b SHA-256: 22aaa3e882155a64b8c2ded5e4c75f301e8fcb882e767254f1db7553b67e085e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, which is a known vector for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, facilitating the activation of the malicious object. The document body itself appears to be unrelated academic content, serving as a lure.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000047bb.bin
e5656f3bf4c7072020ac4dcad75a55cf55b2aedc9c4aae3d3d36f824b1f2c801
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x47BB 1902 bytes