Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 229857a3169301ff…

MALICIOUS

RTF

4.7 KB
MD5: bb96dd52ecb45b886fc555a2c1f72038 SHA-1: 830ad7638c88d2d4ce94296e333037c54e58aeb2 SHA-256: 229857a3169301ff9144a3b0acc11b0aead17290ce9a77d30e697d4a7a441f8e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to Microsoft Equation Editor. Heuristics indicate a high likelihood of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, which allows for arbitrary code execution. This suggests the file is designed to deliver a malicious payload via a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000f1.bin
d9e06c7fd64a0885e1f724a4769275194d99bfab09687da9699e6f643bfd1eb0
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF1 2118 bytes