Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 229578ca826508b3…

MALICIOUS

RTF

93.6 KB First seen: 2024-09-12
MD5: 4dada1c43d8218485ddb6a4ae1fd8fa1 SHA-1: 5646d0388dfa40e64a1da9b4775e9018cdb781c1 SHA-256: 229578ca826508b312ca30025add45dd85696e37c8c3a8776cd3f281bd95022d
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the object is designed to be activated automatically, likely leading to the execution of a malicious payload. The heuristics strongly suggest a classic Equation Editor exploit, commonly used as a delivery mechanism for further stages.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000010e1.bin
974f855ba41fc96e0e6c42c6cf4a703a3565c7d8e4941d67039bdc3efc64420d		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x10E1 1705 bytes

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