Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 228b97fb05c2c2e2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-10-01 07:35:08 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: cdc3aa02223b2fa313bdbab19bb8efef SHA-1: f4cda208ffbeb8676a51978b67e2f17d1b13ff7f SHA-256: 228b97fb05c2c2e26997fd8ed5c832d2ec8b72af69a941b60b9804431be0b295
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and a known malicious redirector. The primary purpose appears to be SEO manipulation and directing users to potentially harmful content under the guise of essay PDFs. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the link farm behavior is a common tactic for distributing malware or phishing content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=baudelaire+the+painter+of+modern+life+and+other+essays+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037191.mozfiles.com/files/1037191/31043165233.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036767.mozfiles.com/files/1036767/kajosakedixizokevuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036750.mozfiles.com/files/1036750/lujudirimikavejenoxulero.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038321.mozfiles.com/files/1038321/23899195795.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.fadwa.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813325/mitikikup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.helpmeimgettingmarried.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741334/goseliwovifudosifu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.findstlr.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856247/puwotawegapi_goloripuvufufev_lasazogisutowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039731.mozfiles.com/files/1039731/29313329963.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037276.mozfiles.com/files/1037276/foranumugutegemu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037035.mozfiles.com/files/1037035/26474842607.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0475/5096/files/gikezob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0462/3800/7456/files/kedopu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0860/5859/files/kaxobalegevez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006146.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6146 5432 bytes
SHA-256: d1c7d6e669d5b81992aec3725acfaf9ec08d69cffc3b410ad6b78441d7f7a00c
font_01_sfnt_off000073a0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x73A0 10172 bytes
SHA-256: c097f8eb98e04f336ce26348d9d4ef207c91c03ea31f347bd5fa970f8d7d682f

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