Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 228a87317f95a97e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.0 KB Created: 2021-09-19 22:12:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 8deed7a6620f688f0d33738078a374f4 SHA-1: b5677879a3282d6b63596c55778ed2bee5dc11cb SHA-256: 228a87317f95a97e4f95ce3efc25d4049fbb9852a429991842336c96406e689b
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous links to external sites, many of which appear to be part of a link farm designed to host or redirect to malicious files. Heuristics indicate these links are on disposable hosting and some point to compromised CMS uploads, suggesting a distribution mechanism for malware. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to trick users into downloading further malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9951

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=disney+hotstar+india+apk
    • http://rencontres-icare.org/userfiles/file/93830026656.pdf
    • https://lanjutpt1.com/contents/files/76473793399.pdf
    • http://vps73.juicy-group.com/editor_upload_image/file/tuxudopakuno.pdf
    • http://shyjjc.com/v15/Upload/file/20219171728428950.pdf
    • http://dbexpertise.fr/catalogue_dynamique/file/66768587886.pdf
    • http://www.binghan.my/userfiles/file/82484968691.pdf
    • http://www.swaving-stalinrichting.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/18157733194.pdf
    • http://onsijsselstein.nl/userfiles/files/jumesapaludurapex.pdf
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16138725608803---defibarakarugowowasorozow.pdf
    • https://himalayanthailand.com/image/upload/File/52009903371.pdf
    • https://pavillonwohlen.ch/userfiles/files/tifisi.pdf
    • http://beautybybelief.com/admin/images/file/zomanavutapeligutepuzu.pdf
    • http://sgo-bage.com/public/files/files/71554964893.pdf
    • https://jck.ro/userfiles/file/58313588705.pdf
    • http://ttlengenharia.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161417871578d3---mawefitotexogadibigopop.pdf
    • https://balbok.net/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/79029895753.pdf
    • http://nemalipics.com/16989859520.pdf
    • http://sts-logistika.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f139835179e2d84a56e708d693022185/65015772628.pdf
    • http://prepearl.com/uploadsfile/42522329482.pdf
    • http://futuralagoparking.eu/userfiles/files/3854149438.pdf
    • http://medica-eg.com/userfiles/file/43635219398.pdf
    • http://goodlife88.com/uploads/files/20033562341.pdf
    • http://jr.ac.th/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lelaj.pdf
    • https://hnhaa.com/userfiles/tnejp/files/dojapun.pdf
    • http://hoclaixebinhthuan.com/upload/contentFile/file/38165169103.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e69d.bin
612e46f795d282061563d12a84ea742b7529d153c601477febc964b3913fafcf		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE69D 18172 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011622.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11622 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012e39.bin
e1ff87fe49bcdc99f99eda31d21ba29137e5e810d74a4f08dc521fc5c893b75e		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12E39 10652 bytes

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