Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2280e408274ba308…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 36bfefea677e3939e5018a83e94792dc SHA-1: 727c559b8867e11eb63e6518aefabcaedf89d9fc SHA-256: 2280e408274ba308f6fc66bbf9bb6ac2c5c30e281b053e46a6cbcc9310a7666a
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering critical heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000bf.bin
f42f9834f0d05ccf7ff4ff27f4c18dabd5da319cd186971a5a877bb06c9303bd		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF 1838 bytes

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