Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 226c9fa12b0f1fe3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

103.5 KB Created: 2021-06-10 14:59:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: 26f9834d42810a850ba0664c16c3f79a SHA-1: 8d76948879f74d9e95331ee1bc9ac6c47a0d0d83 SHA-256: 226c9fa12b0f1fe3e3e5447490d277360ec4060673ac1e4aa95dca8712e8f134
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, indicating it likely exploits PDF vulnerabilities to execute code. The document contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress upload storage and disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The presence of external URIs and the overall structure point towards a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9689

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/uplcv?utm_term=goodwill+of+north+georgia+employee+handbook PDF link annotation
    • https://spazmedia.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b21d27d82fa---ruliwegonowekenabalogudel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kientrucnhacuagio.com/upload/files/56790309297.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bagpack.com.np/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607f477accd5c---55023673962.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reclaimsplus.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/619dd3ed809459162ec91861aec2f2c9/28720992945.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iamsoldierfit.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160831050067f6---dinutanasivoxez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hotwaterfactory.com.au/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e3f20858142b0f6d6d978115804b0a03/tunelorikabipoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://erkerlaender.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609c030c89871---72363770937.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.advids.co/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094367df0984---bevupewav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.chinacimctrailer.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cc2d7b25fb7681eda492e29e3f7f4631/6576764916.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aftaplan.com/works/peepsparty/html/upload_files/file/pukepisep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aliancegroup.su/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7d4fdb0ef9---pifarebarusudifefile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://militarynetwork.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607c728bd8941---41141169073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lbs.ac.at/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/j09tq9qp50m24beoatd4c4ltoh/25384879604.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://perlawarmii.pl/userfiles/file/78455893642.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aimhc.com/userfiles/file/14899240723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.albispanaderia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/22f5fcbe2c1ce73eb649357c7858c759/folenukeluxutotonot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ahi.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6640d188b3f47cd171d0d2a1c5cecb30/92915943505.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00015d02.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15D02 5704 bytes
SHA-256: 9173933989f8aaade33cc956dd95cbb47d9e2b509939cbe392f8258ca8b49433
font_01_sfnt_off0001705e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1705E 11940 bytes
SHA-256: f4b34bd2c53ef82cdb28950bef00420f899134b19589037f74ec5ee815a066e8

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