RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 22688ff9e157c182

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

32.3 KB First seen: 2023-01-19

MD5: 06eaf94652a2911e162a9f2539068fde SHA-1: 0b5d67194a23ca8e383adea70805475b493e00b4 SHA-256: 22688ff9e157c182349eb229dd249290461fa14697355057774dfd45d6aa2eda

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit CVE-2017-11882. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability for initial execution.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00005fbc.bin` `e2d17cdf39e8c7db689e2802b99632318bbc62545d537af977782828286f0fee`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x5FBC	1536 bytes

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