Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22616ef2cac43650…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

18.9 KB
MD5: bd46a396ab8581331b0c1b99868f04de SHA-1: dcc1c530872f0a6d2e369578e23ef3752398b6b2 SHA-256: 22616ef2cac43650f98c2d058fb2d7abf55f1cd5696181f5ccc5d6091a85005f
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. The `RTF_OBJDATA` heuristic further confirms the presence of embedded object data. The primary goal appears to be the execution of code via the Equation Editor vulnerability, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b9d.bin
bdc071c98c5f4261dafec48dac364a8bbc602131e647b8e7e305679781c0dee5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B9D 1917 bytes