Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2260a53324f7a200…

MALICIOUS

PDF

71.0 KB Created: 2021-01-11 09:54:06 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 1168c6f539ac4f972b4bde6a5b5b439a SHA-1: 984d76076f4c59b472f2249f9c87c16a992d10fc SHA-256: 2260a53324f7a200c02760388b4566cccfd891e983024bb9e05fbba201811718
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, evidenced by a large number of external links pointing to disposable hosting services and a suspicious URL. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs suggest it is designed to redirect users to malicious content, likely for credential harvesting or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffe.ru/aws?utm_term=english+language+exam+level+a2%252F+b1+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://lukogazusewof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134643336/maborades.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4453327/normal_5fdf8102d0515.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kelobutino.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969458/fazetegazo_tanemerodujidew_funofibe_sibobajevi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gafalevomunu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134235362/eb892df98afc9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gisipunav.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636927/kuzeretopitoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1175937.mozfiles.com/files/1175937/boranevimiguruwonuxutiliz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kitopelok.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355781/5354023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1168337.mozfiles.com/files/1168337/botiwezusomarodaweviwiwab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zalopajozi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453352/6617667.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://famipitep.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134355151/busino.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xetajikok/l2LQhi7/3d_galaxy_wallpaper_mobile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wepugimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070973/luximidizeniwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ca56.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCA56 5328 bytes
SHA-256: be7e5ae54a9a274e55733166b03af8aff54090093aee89d71d05cdd8c51b6a6a
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc5f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC5F 10732 bytes
SHA-256: 01edfbab45e1eec95b6c95bffb4760b8a50229efd4898c8e96a0c6d103a9c47a
font_02_sfnt_off00010106.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10106 4324 bytes
SHA-256: cd94ef65598b1866d0653cdd88243d989fd81359c0e770c2d3a4858f1c2f6d34

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.