Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2249b2e62706cb8a…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.64 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 86382982793e72c743d6472dfb573711 SHA-1: 88de51e28f74664c1560af6aa6232e6f7af4a9c8 SHA-256: 2249b2e62706cb8ae5fe283b8bb50c81c59db98d128854e939fca6f07b2dd369
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting CVE-2017-8759 via the Equation Editor. This indicates an attempt to exploit a vulnerability for code execution. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly suggests this exploit vector. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was heavily obfuscated, limiting further analysis of the payload's intent.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00191d08.bin
bd0420c1eb51f49c8ef169c49d231d845bbc0acac5c65de4c122dfb9b231f6ad
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x191D08 3732 bytes