Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 221fb83cabfda7d0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: 5559e3314d41000467a0a3477171e44c SHA-1: aaa14010fe75811fc5054e71cc5502d1028fef71 SHA-256: 221fb83cabfda7d08fff4d845a8c3e24c3f425c000399d20331567b4cdcd0dd3
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains an embedded XFA form that triggers a critical vulnerability, CVE-2010-0188, which is known to exploit Adobe Reader. This indicates the file is designed to deliver a malicious payload upon opening. No JavaScript or VBA scripts were directly extracted, but the XFA form's exploit capability is the primary driver of the maliciousness. The embedded file is likely the secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
b7c891e442d31e17140520fdde6911a61e0f476bfa87e28a50c2f6f757f74bc3
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes