Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 220ce07416952dc0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

121.0 KB First seen: 2024-08-13
MD5: b668c0905c4ed7361782db27b29704fa SHA-1: ff18ee2b909d6633bbb02fcacb938ac2e958f604 SHA-256: 220ce07416952dc0b92b60356ca1f549fe0f6baafe717c202bd931674a1d3e7f
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting Microsoft Equation Editor, including OLE object data and automatic linking with an update trigger. These heuristics strongly suggest the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely CVE-2017-11882, to achieve code execution. The primary goal is presumed to be the download and execution of a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000534.bin
14e63c36ddcd2df52da4758d1f6d2f9f9eccfb8a14c1a46149060ac72d41773d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x534 2584 bytes