Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2200158c41a2516e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.1 KB
MD5: 4c7380ca7d98489df3ca858c2e39127f SHA-1: cfcf194ed9a7c4ef48201b062186bf6b7e793b2c SHA-256: 2200158c41a2516e208d5b1c730dd422537334e9712d0c350810d11b26b6fc65
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of ".\..\..\..\windows\system32\calc.exe" within the decoded object data strongly suggests an attempt to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The document body contains only a numeric string, providing no further context on the lure.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ad.bin
c1a31e7ea64fc4c125a14ca4ba431e699644f3bd3191912fbfd94ee566e233ff
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAD 1334 bytes