Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21f06cbf08ee3b92…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.4 KB Created: 2021-09-20 03:32:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-21
MD5: 7eb2cfaffac8962265642c131f60226a SHA-1: 47c2ce194fa2fbf7cfabcafd06f9149ebf0155f4 SHA-256: 21f06cbf08ee3b927f981c8eb817b066a557fa028e3a4ae1f60a6aa8afaa31b7
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs, many of which point to compromised CMS uploads or disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to redirect users. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious. The presence of embedded JavaScript suggests an attempt to execute code, likely to download further payloads or exploit vulnerabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 7

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://inwebjor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=turn+old+cell+phone+into+security+camera PDF link annotation
    • http://unitez.net/images/newtech/files/31352995041.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://solucionaesp.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bibagobefasidawinag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://catwalkdogcome.com/editor_upload_image/file/judimitikavaborigetejuwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chieusangducphat.com/uploads/userfiles/file/pazobut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tea-ra.com/user_data/upload/save_image/files/35104201282.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.entornopublicitario.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3b4f9ab2b5bda637e686d8105d6c0964/jazogimenivoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://chongros.com/userData/board/file/ruxatapag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16144cc242e33e---76167347438.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mayersoffice.com/userfiles/file/musabalojakaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://daithanhnam.com/upload/files/53833508036.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://secureyun.cn/uploadfile/file///2021090613051247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://marcth.pl/media/fck/file/81170003216.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hvezda-pardubice.cz/files/file/jekuwapelizewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ncstarim.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f97tf5pvqbsa2tmcmcb8gv5626/83899714533.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hyundainhapkhau.net/upload/files/pimupumeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dsagco.com/Upload/file/xivenumegazuxupudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://w3-japan.com/js/upload/files/sadedopubimilowalamubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rs-entp.com/upload/file/tovemodo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gowowdeli.com/uploads/files/5827965075.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.niceresidence.net/image/upload/File/25997662385.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gabinetpro.gabinetpro.pl/kosmetyczka/krakow/files/lepenibejaroxirudem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://toyotacri.com/userfiles/files/nerifibefuvagoxifisogo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ncdesign.it/userfiles/files/matet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d6a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD6A4 10956 bytes
SHA-256: ae017094898cbc40043365c97029efa85c69029bef85f93f43adb14d9a7eaa44
font_01_sfnt_off0000efe2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFE2 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000107f4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x107F4 18416 bytes
SHA-256: a6e3113a8dfd80e39e9ffda92c12eebecf47884d5ce1b455b13d3f490dec20c8

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