Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21d9a6c0921e92d2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

74.5 KB Created: 2021-02-16 02:38:33 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: 8c6d1ce3258352a84149eafb9a8a2074 SHA-1: e47f54c8816cecdb5abbb763407dd96fe81e35b8 SHA-256: 21d9a6c0921e92d232633aa39b564f3ac1e14b99823af2b8da3c906835b17bee
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wix?keyword=samsung+top+load+washer+repair+manual In PDF document text
    • https://pememeva.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874233/2f35723bcc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://doleroxewaforud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134322791/ac7c29e1210.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zabojipenow.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636987/pepuzaliwusowe_nutelower_bufowi_wisozovu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/relulapezele/eJxNYid/survive_the_outbreak_game.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/borefigux/Nibstjd/91698492050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/pefemezized/gDagjcV/99224333394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/towojutal/hjc3giT/podimudesunarad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wixexozesila/U1knhey/xatibupisenilimom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://kaposedujeterod.epizy.com/zolevobiraduberezufewa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fegugeg.rf.gd/coindesk_state_of_blockchain_q1_2018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vuraradaso/android_developer_classes_in_ahmedabad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/niwotipugonuvoz/a_101_eleman_alm_bavuru_formu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vitipazapabixu.epizy.com/negewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/biwuwukesazef/15595510741.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rojalexipokadaz/gusineriwodavatila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zijivevip/19969099837.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bexudigibop.rf.gd/dunelm_deep_sided_fitted_sheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mubefula/80526205059.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e665.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE665 5568 bytes
SHA-256: babfa01b6c952420bffc7d0a7ec8345693a9ad42e200715536a988bb7d23f4b2
font_01_sfnt_off0000f937.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF937 10476 bytes
SHA-256: e5748cb7af82a0d6ad371d977665f8fc8a28b5afcca99617cb37bd357f711e3f

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