Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21c7b5dd4aa56941…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.7 KB Created: 2021-04-14 11:56:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 08235fced8789e017e045d5bf36efc8e SHA-1: 0f1edff4f8f0bdc3a7a5e08e3f3ec9771edf8126 SHA-256: 21c7b5dd4aa56941492833e81ec8591d1ee18131e6c6c60acd6556982e2c6ce8
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains a significant number of external links pointing to disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm or SEO manipulation tactic. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs are indicative of malicious activity, potentially leading to further compromise.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bologen.ru/strik?utm_term=what+is+spanning+tree+protocol+in+networking
    • https://tasimaxexakopox.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681882/6a5607eac.pdf
    • http://xiwakaravivomik.scienceontheweb.net/91996080305.pdf
    • http://pro-gram.pro/57488223323r6m4p.pdf
    • http://xegazinijitup.mywebcommunity.org/lidesarif.pdf
    • https://kibepujuvug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134644113/risodibo.pdf
    • https://suvojenedixu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134354738/juduxorobizujubifez.pdf
    • https://nemabofafuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135389169/6411734.pdf
    • http://usblighter24.site/30235363629ow9md.pdf
    • https://godowipi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134520373/pikedokulatabi-zafovi-vagozoganu.pdf
    • https://volorizog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070051/mobezowir_duvubaxokebuzu.pdf
    • http://kiparegazeratax.getenjoyment.net/sularor.pdf
    • https://ralanuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775203/1554481.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • http://tuvufuxo.epizy.com/meiosis_cell_division_stages.pdf
    • http://sonowodiguvab.epizy.com/zibibolupasesowigudafa.pdf
    • http://zerowegujij.onlinewebshop.net/how_to_read_a_z_score_chart.pdf
    • http://bifovigavij.myartsonline.com/mockingjay_part_2_release_date.pdf
    • http://ritumogadoj.onlinewebshop.net/gojapuxitefa.pdf
    • http://nejedezaxusav.rf.gd/kutudivirakomab.pdf
    • http://fekofenuxekit.rf.gd/wutijukajaxi.pdf
    • http://zukisofom.epizy.com/blue_prism_certification_questions.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e0bf.bin
345a65c51faa0463c9c7d024760440da78ff9900cce83dbd5a90f1569136d332		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0BF 5152 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f24f.bin
54b50eb85ac8fb5cf1024e68aed85b3963745fb92a38bdf5b8955767e9899b5d		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF24F 10828 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011752.bin
4fcfa7c68d76e23b667942a3ac892d2d5d88346478daafc61479ad4df4af3dd3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11752 4324 bytes

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