Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21b212c8e47e8784…

MALICIOUS

PDF

61.6 KB Created: 2020-11-17 00:09:57 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 11f3bd01bb17d1156308bcdefd91fee3 SHA-1: e21847096a2cf29e623dc5354cd7f9ed6d0779a8 SHA-256: 21b212c8e47e8784fa3869df7d2c7d013da2d457365e2a6f03761def1b9460f1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of external links pointing to disposable hosting services, indicative of a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely related to phishing or distributing further malware. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and numerous external links suggest it's designed to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/123?utm_term=permutations+worksheet+with+answers+doc PDF link annotation
    • https://kegixofuwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134577478/18f15864e6ef19.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zoditivifu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134316547/wopimamum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rowurasivove.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134357219/a3b8a56.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jerexibim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134654770/vagewemudoj-sibujekol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rurizurerenudiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134649160/8011730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwepurojal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775762/lusexaxapel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dosedupuwosiwoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776272/9d332512d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://betutinixe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134481053/589004.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://niwanokanu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134592400/tasasinir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pixijitawe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134593468/e16adb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://liziruji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134380663/fepagikifiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f2ba7f00-b4e5-4ed8-98a3-0c3fd8c5053e/ccna_wireless_200-355_free_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/323bf6da-2e2f-4d63-8d86-ae8bf80c258c/sam_broadcaster_4.2_2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/lefemijip/beowulf_and_grendel_scenes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/libosokune/a_short_history_of_film.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b632.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB632 5304 bytes
SHA-256: 42fcaebae50a21ceb8c8e3ca5789bfec9d78513e3b9578c8da43c8cf9fefcfbe
font_01_sfnt_off0000c81b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC81B 9696 bytes
SHA-256: bb760494bbbedecf208e6837f58be3f3a5ea3b16b720df8e33ea4a6a421dce4f