Malicious Office (OOXML) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21ab4d43f1127c42…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

10.9 KB Created: 2019-01-14 17:17:08 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: f6f57869c10170744bf2c2078cd8760b SHA-1: f47b12144d1495fad3ceda13618282a0afb5b4d8 SHA-256: 21ab4d43f1127c42afbc0a7547ef4e45efa21b9f897b3b359de7b77d2c2391f8
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model

The sample is an Office Open XML spreadsheet containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor object. Heuristics indicate this object exploits CVE-2018-0798 due to anomalous native stream data. This suggests the file is designed to leverage this vulnerability to execute a malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, and the document body contains only spreadsheet XML structure and data, providing no further context on the payload's intent.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/spreadsheetml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2009/9/ac
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2014/revision
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2015/revision2
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/spreadsheetml/2016/revision3

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
42301c81780fa1edd0037369de80bef45b1ffa665c50326497e5663fac46ca0f		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 4096 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
3bfaa9c8b1cb8b7fd8f126515a6c29dcaf60a94aab027dfd0f11de073b4c1dc2		 ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: ole10NaTIVe 1567 bytes

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