Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 219b27a00a4d8ad5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: 49cf8460e16a4f8adb1a46f4e8291eff SHA-1: 054db3f6cd94a6d34249b70012258f0768312e04 SHA-256: 219b27a00a4d8ad5661df16829684383185ba6b887ac300ccf8653e37d6fee67
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a PDF document that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's XFA form processing. The critical heuristic indicates that the PDF contains an inline XFA image with a TIFF payload designed to trigger this exploit. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine, likely to download and run a secondary payload. No scripts were directly extracted, but the PDF structure and exploit target are clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
8b12f446e8593937c3a2af79df5b7782dd465d9bf4060a1226f2286f4220b619
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes