RTF malware analysis — malicious · 2187745dcc704a8e

MALICIOUS

RTF

43.6 KB First seen: 2023-07-12

MD5: fdd8c54cb9c4249532e2e00910c8ff36 SHA-1: a63ab26f4adde349872fd4785449b76d74f8592c SHA-256: 2187745dcc704a8e203aa138a9a6f63f1ffe5ebb08129899cdec638ab48b7e41

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor, and uses an 'Enable editing' lure. This strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism, likely for a second-stage payload. The document body content appears to be legitimate academic text, indicating the lure is the primary malicious component.

Heuristics 5

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000596d.bin` `7d07635d63d38c31e051078967eb25f32866ba907274db3b24bbe7461433dee3`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x596D	1747 bytes

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