Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 216535d52cca5435…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.2 KB Created: 2021-07-01 21:13:30 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: e78fc74002356f87313b55a45be1a11b SHA-1: 6d38d2e526d3dfdaa8ceeb76754300d592c819c0 SHA-256: 216535d52cca5435e521ba9834332dcbead1eda55327135da8d966ec79e38696
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, employing a link farm hosted on compromised WordPress sites to direct users towards potentially malicious downloads. The presence of multiple PDF links, many pointing to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, strongly suggests an attempt to distribute malware or facilitate phishing. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9835

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=gta+4+crack+and+patch+file+download
    • https://thejinglelab.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e71ptto3vlgc9m9rck2npuaka0/xuwetajidawuzos.pdf
    • https://mlmrockstars.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/57591447457.pdf
    • http://absolutelyneon.com/userfiles/file/xebojorurojerigukid.pdf
    • https://www.lenoir-elec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/obfh4sb1274rh3gtf56ada5kja/65171405271.pdf
    • https://a2designbg.com/userfiles/file/32653068389.pdf
    • https://frasertechno.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d0a215060bf---jilebawe.pdf
    • http://developmentassociationofnagaland.org/nbloom/fckuploads/file/2851778680.pdf
    • http://www.jindatunnel.com/up_files/file/65293483177.pdf
    • http://minuspk.ru/minuspk.ru/userfiles/file/dozikorawixetidawabo.pdf
    • http://woonhuislift.info/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607443de59517---7479236185.pdf
    • http://facilitymanagementassociates.com/survey/userfiles/files/55542756766.pdf
    • https://asiarsolutions.com/userfiles/file/pafilijugojewufotavav.pdf
    • http://trustarshida.co/cache/fck_files/file/56701382864.pdf
    • https://envomask.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/11c834e1b4aed9fa66a599f152aa1443/79077944304.pdf
    • https://puertoestereo.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9p89l2m2ojliv9r1jc76bf0ftm/72617622884.pdf
    • http://kystop.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/j56q6k3cok31ve07rkk4ul0os4/81416868681.pdf
    • https://www.jemelectric.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160dcb4e811150---javega.pdf
    • https://californiaoptionsrealestate.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3155ddb7f6819d84efbfbfc5858315bf/juxidujonevukuvanir.pdf
    • https://provisionsinternational.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8a50678e6f---deniravebefusakive.pdf
    • https://majorsagilekvaros.hu/uploads/file/73841405395.pdf
    • http://allaboutdowney.com/userimages/sibotizezakovozavonavi.pdf
    • http://www.advancedevents.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c1812503dfc---pukokemuzexojagazegi.pdf
    • http://sodrex.pl/userfiles/file/makenujugurawalojukojujas.pdf
    • https://www.truesdalepainting.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d195298d79---39207752991.pdf
    • https://comobrew.com/newsite/images/user_uploads/file/wofemarotuwunax.pdf
    • http://allaboutdowney.com/userimages/66299963784.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eae1.bin
756fb9d67a8d75b48df5efa76d5d474d5ded12aa618d1b079bdd63b1fbf7e3a3
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAE1 10844 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000103ea.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x103EA 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00011bfc.bin
889420b0f3cdf47efb96839595dbefaeb8ac6e7905625a3039468f0955e79ee4
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BFC 29164 bytes