Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 216056762b171e17…

MALICIOUS

PDF

112.7 KB Created: 2021-09-05 01:22:49 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-14
MD5: 08b7083d07e0118e5d1e0ad2d8d30557 SHA-1: eca45dcac10bb0bc34508611fc42c1f4d2ec981c SHA-256: 216056762b171e1704a5ac56ba2fef14f1fb174b36137bc9d7046f35d4b7af23
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document employs a social engineering tactic, presenting a lure to install a browser extension or update to view its content. The presence of multiple links to compromised WordPress upload storage and disposable hosting suggests an attempt to distribute further malicious payloads or phishing pages. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely involving the exploitation of the user's trust to execute further code.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9966

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://home18.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/34e1aecb49ba81349f36128b0faf6b38/2664384843.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://www.lbf-cosmetics.com/website/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a7220a82563---88604004657.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bukharajohnscreek.com/sites/default/files/file/keteferabalaxevagejuvofat.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://michardardillier.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/22260088382.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mega.kz/media/upload/files/xoxaruwekirirok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://local-atlas.ru/userfiles/files/60692174585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://grupomarsamo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160799f634b547---1597433652.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.landalastadservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608bef9754c35---45865879926.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phillipsbricksalumni.com/clients/56168/File/13215115992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.zopfitravel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c074ece00b7---2997992071.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lang-mayer.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aa1410267bd---doropevusavinisu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://biharlokmanch.org/userfiles/file/fefiguxopizajeluk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allmedicus.com/userfiles/file/xakiputenam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mysmilestudios.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/88032dbb9ae79fb34ec0a98cab260167/9329247694.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://elisa5888.com/shopadmin/upload/files/bijutuven.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://montaze.org/democms/userfiles/file/87207769763.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sgcaregiver.org/contents/files/munumololesivuguse.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://billionbosses.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/97495654615.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jclifeschools.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9d207f9f8e1fd59949f1d556bd24e9bc/34047683957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://baileyelectrical.services/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7m161tgvu06mkaf2t1kec3l04l/diworewezopixowizinosi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://diamantina-joaillerie.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/doderogagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://belgium-ex.com/images/blog//file/zusazorasutupevurafepar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gmonlinestore.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b9135c1910---17970134851.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://srp-galabau-rostock.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9k53vmacfroidcgae9n5fvcmu3/86832149390.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160f2e167b65dc---8021915675.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=osha+confined+space+training+manualPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00015313.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15313 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00016b2a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16B2A 11192 bytes
SHA-256: 0e225ad0ade313afc55b1db38f220e76de2d51669b598c6908195ad201061dff
font_02_sfnt_off000184f8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x184F8 18360 bytes
SHA-256: 3505876273a874d533577f4b395b244e9bab7a4ef9d88f19f7588a0c57afff61

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