Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2144c86c5c803000…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.2 KB Created: 2021-01-04 01:00:48 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-16
MD5: d2d3feb01d7b7690957b41f0434eb8fe SHA-1: e0087ab73c2bcf99d4905ca3246e640c6d83c24b SHA-256: 2144c86c5c80300013a2902e21dbf9ac9c2f7ddb1b58759a8ae0aae237aa8ed7
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO spam campaign. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or distributing further malware. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself is designed to redirect users to potentially harmful external sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?utm_term=characteristics+of+formal+organizational+structure PDF link annotation
    • https://banetopebored.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134874573/4436481.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4365624/normal_5fc4bad54758e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bezijenogekise.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134875893/tebutewavevis-fisasuve-zoperagagujoru-vediwovuruxajo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xikalevu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319979/1ef5e5d14bd2a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lamamamim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606140/41dfe18bb83a9ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4418565/normal_5fe9d29a807d4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4480589/normal_5fd9133eaca76.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kagelemovo/dFT3gcm/blades_of_brim_hack_download.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vusukiziroge.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969505/wejivajiwikuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wiremeresegikon/industrialization_anticipation_guide_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tikoweravisixu/ryanair_app_for_blackberry.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e35c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE35C 5248 bytes
SHA-256: 59590ab28ced1af926d76724b2aa6a5e4450388585f262ae8eae1995f46acf7b
font_01_sfnt_off0000f50f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF50F 10304 bytes
SHA-256: 363eaaf6c74f79aeaa24af9cd12484021012a7705c8cb833ac98e723ea683d1d