Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 213d36f7d37abac0…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.8 KB
MD5: fb311b1bd9ad428b7eda83b0b68cac0e SHA-1: 532cfca603a1846b077561ad5e8d255bb40979b4 SHA-256: 213d36f7d37abac0df9187e6ce3ed8e26bc61bd3e02a725b079be90d7cfd5117
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the embedded OLE object, which is likely a malicious payload, to activate upon opening the document. This indicates an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor component for arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000ca.bin
818dd8d442c9efba378f62faeeaa53be8526af71e6ae6b1c5fa7530f2618b8fc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCA 1623 bytes