Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 21345784cfb1061e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.87 MB First seen: 2022-06-20
MD5: ce4a8707e848902ce7254fede7f220b3 SHA-1: c76385f992fbef687baffce145f2c5acad1d14a3 SHA-256: 21345784cfb1061e57279d33df8e16539a499bd90cc24d986950a7bd53b50671
220 Risk Score

Heuristics 6

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000df9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xDF9 43069 bytes
SHA-256: f4710888599083f2bc29e89525d4eea1c4a65057ea2834262176bac3b9b1f8df
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): Wscript.Echo "Process " & objProcess.Caption & " belongs to " & Domain & "\" & User, Wscript.Echo "Problem " & Rtn & " getting the owner for process " & objProcess.Caption, wscript.exe"
objdata_01_off00035252.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x35252 287991 bytes
SHA-256: c1a69f62371235b843e6c88d86337adc363627dc9f49d6df4d9a72e8e787aa66