MALICIOUS
154
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
The PDF was flagged by multiple heuristics, including a critical ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962' and a high-severity 'PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGER' indicating an XFA-based exploit. The presence of embedded files and an embedded URL further supports its malicious nature. The primary attack pattern involves exploiting XFA form functionality to execute malicious code, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000
Heuristics 6
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ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36962
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XFA title base-26 eval stager high PDF_XFA_TITLE_BASE26_EVAL_STAGERPDF XFA initialize script reads an encoded payload from the document title, builds event.target.eval and String.fromCharCode from string fragments, decodes base-26 character pairs, and evals the recovered stage. This is an exploit-kit staging pattern; the static bytes do not prove a specific CVE by themselves.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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XFA form low PDF_XFAPDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-locale-set/2.1/
Extracted artifacts 5
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
embedded_file_obj0041.binc06dcd026a7ea0536b63e07ce688691b585339a3ab7ff59065e546b56308c7bb |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x2AB2 | 85 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0042.bindda0835df994b8be920f715db36452f6cee7bb42bbc9c897f878a7b298ba8e91 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 42 at offset 0x2B64 | 1029 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0043.bind7f7bd6434fff4670f50233bfe5cf596fac9d4d44d97771942e495ed6801d5e8 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 43 at offset 0x2D7D | 1949 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0044.bin3dd68f00f4fcb366a2a3a17c65cb2626eeddf5ea5713302d374310561d810169 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 44 at offset 0x3204 | 144 bytes |
embedded_file_obj0045.bin10c03f88a5f0a0833dc5b2c8ac295b3a3c6f65e23889eb8cc1dc6fe29bf7f275 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 45 at offset 0x32B0 | 77 bytes |
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